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Calendar
June 7--Colorado and Denver Bar Associations one-day institute on plan-
ning and administration of estates, Shirley-Savoy Hotel, Denver. Carl
B. Rix, president of the American Bar Association, will be the speaker
at the evening dinner.
June 13,. 14 and 16-Tenth Judicial Circuit annual conference, United States
District Courtroom, Post Office Building, Denver. Program will be
announced in June DICTA.
June 25-Denver Bar Association annual picnic, Troutdale.
July 1-Term of office of new officers of Denver Bar Association begins.
Sept. 22-26-American Bar Association annual meeting, Cleveland, Ohio.
Oct. 6-Denver Bar Association, regular monthly meeting, 12:15 P. M.,
Chamber of Commerce dining room.
Oct. 16-District Judges' Association annual meeting, County Judges' Asso-
ciation meeting, District Attorneys' Association meeting, Board of Gov-
ernors meeting, Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs.
Oct. 17-18-Colorado Bar Association annual meeting, Broadmoor Hotel,
Colorado Springs.
Denver and Colorado Bar Associations Will Hold
Institute June 7th
In the April issue of DICTA announcement was made of the one day
institute of the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations to be held on June 7th
at the Shirley-Savoy Hotel, Denver, and the evening dinner which will be
addressed by Carl B. Rix, president of the American Bar Association.
The morning and afternoon sessions will consist of an institute, on estate
planning and administration. The following hypothetical estate will be the
basis for the discussion:
John Isekore, a resident of Colorado, is a mining engineer, 50 years of
age, whose family consists of his wife, Ada, 40 years old, an adopted daughter,
Bertha, age 16, a son, Carl, 18, in military service overseas, and a son Donald,
21. Donald is married and John, the father, regards Donald's wife as one
of the family.
John's estate consists of the following assets, all of which stand in his
name, except as otherwise stated:
DICTA
Description Value
Family car .......................................................................... $ 500
Family home --------------------------------....-------------------------------- 15,000
Rental property, a store, leased for five years from
January, 1943, at $100 per month payable in advance
on the first day of each month .................. 10,000
Note of Y for $5000, due July 1, 1948, with interest
at 5%, payable January 1 and July 1-............ 5,000
$2000 face value City of Denver general obligation
bonds due January 1, 1950, interest 2%, payable
January 1 and July 1 ................................................ 2,000
$2000 face value Series E, U.S. Defense bonds, dated
March 1, 1941, in name of John and Ada as co-owners 2,000
$1000 face value, series G, U.S. Defense bonds, in name
of John only ................................................................ 1,000
100 shares common stock, General Motors Corporation- 6,000
75 shares common stock, A. T. & T. Co ---------------.......... 10,000
Six life insurance policies, each for $5000, each in a dif-
ferent company and all payable to wife, Ada, install-
ments ---------- : ............................................................... 30,000
Total ---------------------------------............------------------------------------- $81,000
John is going to South America on business and he wishes to fix up his
affairs so that they will be in the best possible shape if anything happens to
him. He has no will.
The morning session will be devoted to a panel discussion of the most
advantageous means of arranging John's affairs. Morrison Shafroth will act
as moderator of the panel, which will be comprised of Edward King, dean
of the University of Colorado Law School, Willson Hurt, professor at the
University of Denver Law School, and Hugh McLean, Trust Officer of the
Colorado National Bank. Among the objectives and problems to be dis-
cussed are:
Support and maintenance of the widow during her life, possibly 30 years.
Education of the children.
Support and maintenance until the sons get started in business and the
daughter marries.
Help for Donald's widow.
Prevention of dissipation of estate through extragavance or bad man-
agement.
Eventual distribution of balance, if any, to John's descendents.
The relation of principal and income probably available as compared to
the needs of the family.
DICTA
Possible modes of disposition, including: inter vivos gifts, joint tenancies;
living trust, both revocable and irrevocable; life insurance trusts; a will both
with and without a testamentary trust; a close family corporation.
In the afternoon, Horace N. Hawkins, Jr., will carry through the
administration of John's estate as finally planned by the panel in the morn-
ing, after which T. Raber Taylor will "walk through" the state and federal
income tax returns of the decedent and of the estate, pointing out the differ-
ences between the state and federal requirements. If time permits, he will
also highlight some of the distinctions between the state and federal laws
and regulations regarding federal estate and state inheritance tax returns.
The entire afternoon session will be devoted to the practical application of
the probate and tax laws rather than to a theoretical interpretation of the
legal problems involved.
At the noon luncheon Judge C. Edgar Kettering will discuss the admin-
istration of estates from still another angle-that of the judge who is on the
receiving end of the lawyer's efforts.
To open the day the Junior Bar Section will hold a breakfast meeting
at 8:15 A.M.
And to bring the day to a climax, Carl B. Rix, president of the Ameri-
can Bar Association will be the speaker at the informal banquet to be held
at the hotel in the evening.
Milton Shrednik's seven-piece string ensemble will furnish music at the
dinner, and special entertainment will be by the "Men of the West" quartet.
DON'T MISS THE JUNE 7 MEETING.
"Who's Who-Women Lawyers" Soon To Be Published
Nearing completion is the new WHO'S WHO-WOMEN LAWYERS.
Editor of this book is Laura Miller Derry, Louisville attorney, active practi-
tioner, participant and office holder in local, national and international bar
associations during the past ten years. She recently completed her term as
President of the National Association of Women Lawyers and is now Direc-
tor of that organization. For two years she has served as Recording Secre-
tary of the Women Lawyers International Association. Kappa Beta Pi, oldest
international legal sorority, recently conferred rare honorary membership upon
Mrs. Derry at a ceremony in Washington.
Assembling names and addresses of the several thousand women law-
yers in the United States was no easy task, because available lists were fre-
quently incomplete. If any woman lawyer of this state has not received, a
questionnaire, she should contact the editor at 509 Kentucky Home Life
Building, Louisville, Kentucky, at once.
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New Officers of Denver Bar Association
The following new officers of the Denver Bar Association were elected
for terms beginning July 1, 1947 at the annual meeting held on May 5, 1947:
Horace F. (Jack) Phelps, First Natl. Bank Bldg .......................... President
Sydney H. Grossman, Security Life Bldg ................... First Vice-President
Foster Cline, E. & C. Bldg ................................ Second Vice-President
M. B. Holt, Jr., Colorado Natl. Bank Bldg ............................ Trustee
Stanley R. Johnson, E. & C. Bldg ............................................... Trustee
The nominating committee consisted of: Ernest B. Fowler, Percy S.
Morris, Archibald A. Lee, Ernest L. Rhoads and R. Hickman Walker.
New Members of Denver Bar Association
The following persons were admitted to membership in the Denver Bar
Association at the April 7, 1947, meeting:
Charles F. Cory John S. Poyen
Peter J. Little Robert C. Nihan
John H. Winchell
The following persons were admitted to membership in the Denver Bar
Association at the May 5, 1947, meeting:
Jack L. Graham Justin D. Hannen
Some Facts Concerning District, County, and
Justice Courts in Colorado
By ALBERT E. SHERLOCK, Denver Chairman of the Justice Courts Com-
mittee, and STANLEY H. JOHNSON, Executive Secretary of the Judiciary
Committee of the Colorado Bar Association.
Complete data is being compiled by the Judiciary Committee, with the
help of the district and county chairmen, upon the district, county, and jus-
tice courts in Colorado. Although the extensive questionnaires have not all
been returned, some interesting facts concerning these courts are here pre-
sented.
District Courts
The following tabulation, based upon the 1940 census, shows, as of that
date, the counties contained within each judicial district, the number of judges
for each district, the population for each county, and for each district, and
the number of people in each county being served by each district judge.
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DISTRICT COURTS BY POPULATION
1940 Census
Population
Dist. County No. of Judges County District Per judge
2nd Denver ................. 7 *328,647 328,647 46,947
8th Boulder .................. 2 37,483
Jackson .................. 1,798
Larimer .................. 35539
Weld ...................... 63,747 138,567 69,283
10th Crowley ................ 2 5,398
O tero -------------------- 23,571
Pueblo .................. 68,870 97,839 48,919
4th Cheyenne .............. 2 * 2,964
Douglas ................ 3,496
Elbert .................... 5,460
El Paso ................ 54,025
Kit Carson ............ 7,512
Lincoln .................. 5,882
Teller .................... 6,463 85,802 42,901
1st Adams .................. 2 22,481
Arapahoe ------------- * 25,915
Clear Creek ---------- 3,784
Gilpin .................... 1,625
Jefferson ................ 30,745 84,530 42,265
7th Delta ................. 2 16,470
Gunnison .............. 6,192
Hinsdale ................ 349
M esa ..................... 33,791
Montrose .............. 15,418
Ouray .................. 2,089
San Miguel .......... 3,664 77,973 38,986





Yuma .................... 12,102 66,264 33,132




Rio Grande .......... 12,404
Saguache .............. 6,173 49,217 49,217
* Population of Westwood added to Denver, subtracted from Arapahoe.
*** House Bill 469, now pending, transfers Cheyenne County fron the 4th to the
15th District.
Population
Dist. County No. of Judges County District Per Judge
3rd Huerfano .............. **2 16,088 48,457
Las Animas .......... 32,369 22,228
1 1th Chaffee .................. 1 8,109
Custer .................... 2,270
Fremont .............. 19,742
Park ...................... 3,272 33,393 33,393
6th Archuleta .............. 1 3,806
Dolores .................. 1,958
La Plata ---------------- 15,494
Montezuma ............ 10,463
San Juan .............. 1,439 33,160 33,160
15th Baca ...................... 1 6,207
Bent ...................... 9,653
Kiowa .................... 2,793
Prowers .................. 12,304 30,957 30,957
14th Grand .................... 1 3,587
M offat .................... 5,086
Routt .................... 10,525 19,198 19,198
9th Garfield ................ 1 10,560
Pitkin .................... 1,836
Rio Blanco ............ 2,943 15,339 15,339
5th Eagle .............. 1 ,361
Lake ...................... 6,883
Summit .................. 1,754 13,998 13,998
•* Statute now provides for only one judge as soon as vacancy occurs.
The table indicates that the average population served by each judge is
in round figures 36,000. There are therefore four districts, the Third, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth, so far below this average that it might be thought
any two of them could be served by a single judge. On the other hand the
Eighth District, comprising Boulder, Jackson, Larimer, and Weld counties,
is so far above the average as to indicate some need for relief.
However, there are factors other than population bearing upon the need
for district judges. They are in a sense circuit judges, and the area they are
required to serve and the actual number of trials are perhaps of greater im-
portance. From a standpoint of area, also, the Eighth District would appear
to need an additional judge.
On the other hand, area does not bear upon the question in Denver. It
has been said that each of the district judges in Denver tries annually ten
times as many cases as some of the judges in sparsely settled districts. The
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state's metropolis attracts most of the criminal element. According to the
Denver Probation Department two-thirds of the crime committed in the state
takes place in Denver and two-thirds of the inmates of the penitentiary have
been committed from the Denver District Court. Furthermore, most civil
cases in the nature of mandamus by or against state officials, declaratory
judgments, workmen's compensation, appeal from decisions of Public Utilities
Commission and the like are tried there. Nevertheless, during the more nor-
mal period before the war, it cannot be said that the district judges in Denver
were overtaxed or the dockets overcrowded. This would indicate that the
average of 36,000 population per judge could easily be increased, providing
the elements of serving an extensive area, or having a judge available for
matters of course at a number of county seats, did not interfere.
These are some of the questions which the committee hopes can be
answered when all the returns are in. In order to obtain a sound conclusion,
the Denver committee for this court must analyze the facts obtained with care.
For example, together wiih the number of trials by a court in a given county,
the number of trial days consumed must also be considered, and also the
fluctuations in the number of trials and trial days over the ten year period.
Returns are in for the district courts in a number of counties. Among
them are Weld and Moffat. A comparison of these two counties is interest-
ing. Weld is one of the counties in the Eighth District. It has a total popu-
lation of 138,567, served by two judges. Moffat is one of three counties in
the Fourteenth District, having a population of 19,198, served by one judge.
Weld's population is 63,747, Moffat's 5,086. In 1946 there were 177 cases
tried by the district judges in Weld, consuming 209 days; in 1938, 163
trials consuming 302 days. In Moffat in 1946, there were 76 trials requiring
45 days and in 1938, 55 trials requiring 47 days. Hence, although the ratio
of population in Moffat to Weld is only 8%, the ratio of trial days utilized
was 15% in the year 1938, or nearly double the time consumed per capita in
Weld County.
Although the translation of the statistics by the committee will be diffi-
cult, they will surely show more clearly than any evidence previously avail-
able the judicial needs of our state. Once these facts are established, they
may be kept current by a judicial council or similar body receiving annual
reports from the clerks of court, as is now done in Michigan.
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County Courts
The following tabulation shows the classification of the various counties,
the salaries paid the judges and clerks of the county courts, and the county
population as of 1940.




County Co. Judge Clk. Co. Ct. Population
CLASS I.
Denver .................................... $7,000.00 $4,200.00 *328,647
GROUP A CLASS II
El Paso .................................... $5,000.00 $2,500.00 54,025
Pueblo .................................... 5,000.00 2,500.00 68,870
Weld ...................................... 5,000.00 2,500.00 63,747
GROUP B
Arapahoe ................................ $3,600 00 $2,400.00 *25,915
Boulder .................................... 3,600.00 2,400.00 37,483
Jefferson .................................. 3,600.00 2,400.00 30,745
Larimer .................................... 3,600.00 2,400.00 35,539
Las Animas ............................ 3,600.00 2,400.00 32,369
Mesa ........................................ 3,600.00 2,400.00 33,791
GROUP A CLASS III
Adams .................................... $3,000.00 $1,800.00 22,481
Fremont .................................. 3,000.00 1,800.00 19,742
Logan ...................................... 3,000.00 1,800.00 18,370
Morgan .................................... 3,000.00 1,800.00 17,214
Otero ...................................... 3,000.00 1,800.00 23,571
GROUP B
Alamosa .................................. $2,400.00 $1,700.00 10,484
Conejos .................................... 2,400.00 1,700.00 11,648
Delta ...................................... 2,400.00 1,700.00 16,470
Garfield .................................. 2,400.00 1,700.00 10,560
Huerfano ................................ 2,400.00 1,700.00 16,088
La Plata ............................ ..... 2,400.00 1,700.00 15,494
Montrose ............................... . 2,400.00 1,700.00 15,418
Prowers .................................. 2,400.00 1,700.00 12,304
Rio Grande ............................ 2,400.00 1,700.00 12,404
Routt ...................................... 2,400.00 1,700.00 10,525
Yuma ...................................... 2,400.00 1,700.00 12,102




County Co. Judge Clk. Co. Ct. Popuiaton
GROUP A CLASS IV
Baca ........................................ $2,100.00 $1,700.00 6,207
Bent ........................................ 2,100.00 1,700.00 9,653
,Chaffee .................................... 2,100.00 1,700.00 8,109
Costilla .................................. 2,100.00 1,700.00 7,533
Gunnison ................................ 2,100.00 1,700.00 6,192
Kit Carson ............................ 2,100.00 1,700.00 7,512
Lake ........................................ 2,100.00 1,700.00 6,883
Montezuma ............................ 2,100.00 1,700.00 10,463
Teller ...................................... 2,100.00 1,700.00 6,463
Washington ............................ 2,100.00 1,700.00 8,336
GROUP B
Crowley ................................. $1,900.00 $1,500.00 5,398
Eagle ........................................ 1,900.00 1,500.00 5,361
Elbert .................................... 1,900.00 1,500.00 5,460
Lincoln .................................. 1,900.00 1,500.00 5,882
Moffat ...................................... 1,900.00 1,500.00 5,086
Phillips .................................... 1,900.00 1,500.00 4,948
Saguache ................................ 1,900.00 1,500.00 6,173
Sedgwick ................................ 1,900.00 1,500.00 5,294
GROUP A CLASS V
Archuleta ................................ $1,800.00 $1.200.00 3,806
Cheyenne*** .......................... 1,800.00 1,200.00 2,964
Clear Creek ......................... 1,800.00 1,200.00 3,784
Custer .................................... 1,800.00 1,200.00 2,270
Douglas .................................. 1,800.00 1,200.00 3,496
Grand ...................................... 1,800.00 1,200.00 3,587
Kiowa ...................................... 1,800.00. 1,200.00 2,793
Ouray ...... . .................... 1,800.00 1,200.00 2,089
Park ........................................ 1,800.00 1,200.00 3,272
Rio Blanco** ........................ 1,800.00 1,200.00 2,943
San Miguel ............................ 1,800.00 1,200.00 3,664
GROUP A CLASS VI
Dolores ................................... $1,500.00 $1,000.00 1,958
Gilpin ..................................... 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,625
Jackson ................................. 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,798
Pitkin ..................... 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,836
San Juan ................................ 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,439
Summit .................................. 1,500.00 1,000.00 1,754
GROUP B
Mineral .................................... $ 600.00 $ 400.00 975
GROUP C
Hinsdale .................................. $ 400.00 $ 400.00 349
** By House Bill No. 159 which has become law, Rio Blanco County has been
moved from Class V to Class IV, Group A.
*** House Bill No. 469, now pending, transfers Cheyenne County from the 4th
to the 15th district.
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The county judges of the following counties are lawyers: Denver, El
Paso, Pueblo, Weld, Arapahoe, Boulder, Jefferson, Larimer, Las Animas, Mesa,
Adams, Logan, Morgan, Otero, Conejoh, Delta, Garfield, La Plata, Rio
Grande, Bent, Lincoln, Pitkin.
Omitting Denver, the average population served by the county judge is
12,800, or about one-third the number served by each district judge. Denver
is not comparable because, although only one judge presides there, others are
continually called in for the trial of cases, claims, and the hearing of motions
and other matters. Only 18 of the 62 remaining county courts try more than
the average number of cases.
The returns from the county court questionnaires will show how many
days supply judges were necessary in Pueblo, Weld, and El Paso, the top
three after Denver in population, and in Group B of Class II, where the
population exceeds 30,000. They will also show other matters of importance,
such as the number of cases tried originally in the county court and again
de novo in the district court.
It has been stated to the committee in letters received from the bar that
the county courts cannot be combined with the district courts, if such a
change should appear desirable, because the county judge is always available,
and a district judge would not be unless one were provided for each county.
It has also been said that the county court tries as many cases as the district
court in the county. Returns from Moffat show that the county court tried
66 cases in 1946 as compared with 76 cases in the district court, and in 1938,
35 cases in the county court, compared with 47 in the district court. The re-
turns for Weld County Court are not in.
In Hinsdale where the population was 349 there were five trials before
the county court in 1942, consuming one trial day, and none in 1938, 1940,
1944, and 1946. On the basis of the present statute the judge would have
been paid a salary of $400 for each of these five years, or $2,000, so that for
his services alone these hearings would have cost the county $400 each. Dur-
ing the same years the county court in Boulder, where the population was
37,483, tried at least 1,526 cases, treating each estate as one case. The judge
received $3,600 for each of these years, a total for the five years of $18,000,
or about $12 a case for his services. Incidentally, he served outside the county
45 days during the three years 1942, 1944, and 1946 (no prior record) and
was paid a statutory allowance of $12 a day, comparable to his pay per trial
at home.
La Plata County has a population of 15,494, close to the average for the
state. It tried 1,235 cases in the five years, together with hearings exceeding
that number. Its judge received a salary of $2,400 or $12,000 for the five
years, or a cost for the judge's services alone of about $10 a case. His rate
of pay was less than $7 a day.
It is worthy of note that there were no jury trials in the La Plata County
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Court in those five years and only five jury trials in the five years in the
Boulder County Court. Apparently, there must be considerable confidence
in the integrity and judiciousness of the county judges in those counties.
The statistics on these courts, when complete, will develop a great many
other matters of interest to the bar and public too numerous to mention here.
Justice Courts
No other courts in this country have received the attention that has been
focused upon the justice of the peace courts in the past few years. It is time,
indeed, that some analysis was made of them and corrective measures taken,
for no other court dispenses justice to so many people. It is important that
what is dispensed should be justice, and not something else, which may im-
press the average citizen with the unfairness and incompetence of our judicial
system.
There can be no question that the system, devised for use in frontier days
or in early years when transportation was slow, has serious faults. This is
easily demonstrated by the action being taken in other states, selected at ran-
dom, and by the comments of our own bar.
In Missouri such courts have been abolished and magistrates under super-
vision of superior courts substituted, according to population requirements.
In Iowa the legislature passed a resolution that they should be abolished. The
judicial councils in Ohio and Michigan have recommended their abolition or
control with carefully planned substitute courts, and the California legisla-
ture has requested the council there to make a thorough investigation and
report on the inferior court system.
The plea of convenience is made for them, but the counter argument is
that it is better to have a lawyer paid by salary at all times available at the
county seat, than a village mechanic, like the justice in Hinsdale County,
who repairs cars and tries cases only during the summer season, and moves
on to better climes for eight months of the year. A justice of this kind in
the language of one commentator is likely, when you need him, to be hoeing
his brother's potato patch ten miles away, or vacationing in New Orleans.
Some of the comments received from our bar are enlightening. Under
our laws and constitution the county commissioners are to determine the
number of justice precincts, but for every one established there must be two
justices and two constables. They are to have such jurisdiction as the legisla
ture bestows upon them, not exceeding $300 in civil cases.
One county chairman reports: prior to 1933 there were several precincts,
but no justice who was elected ever qualified except in three towns. The
commissioners then reduced the precincts to two with the hope that the requi-
site number would qualify, but although justices were elected in 1936, 1940,
1942, and 1946, in No. 1 none of them qualified. Even in No. 2, where
there had always been two justices, last year, though two were elected, only
one qualified and later resigned. The office should be abolished and matters
handled by the county judge at the county seat.
In another county there are only two justices, both in one town. The
justices elected in the other precincts all failed to qualify. In a third county,
five precincts were reduced some years ago to two. There is only one justice
in each, and one of those is about to go on old age pension and resign. It is
impossible to get candidates. In still another county there are two justices
in each of two precincts, one each in two others, and none who will qualify
in the other seven. In another some of the precincts have had none for over
twenty years. The chairman gives these reasons: there is no necessity for
them in these modern days; no one wants the job because it .pays little and is
a nuisance; when a justice is elected, he fails to qualify. Often the income
is not enough to induce the justice to pay $10 for his bond.
Another reports there is only one justice in the county; the commis-
sioners do not bother to fill the vacancies or cannot get anyone to act. Another
states the court in one substantial town is operated on a very loose basis.
The justice fails to report his fees to the county; very little justice is dealt
out; the justice's principal occupation is that of bill collector; the chairman
knows of only one occasion when a lawyer has appeared in that court.
Following are the statistics on the business in one justice court, showing




Age Civil Jdmt. Jdmt. Costs Fees
of Cases for for Dis, Col. Col-
Tear J. P. Tried Pltf. Def. missed lected lected
1943 ........ 70 6 5 0 1 $ 30.25 $22.30
1944 ........ 71 8 6 0 2 39.55 33.45
1945 _ .... 72 9 3 0 6 53.95 31.60
1946 .......73 27* 7 0 17 120.0 84.50
* one change of venue, one no service, one continued
Criminal Of Which Cases Jdmt. Jdmt.MotorCases Vehicle Actually for for Dis- Costs FinesTear Tried There Were Tried State Def. missed Collected Collected
1943 .... 13 7 13 10 0 3 $ 90.00 $ 225.00
1944 .... 52 35 47 39 0 8 176.18 765.00
1945 .... 54 42 54 52 0 2 265.82 1370.00
1946 .... 121 56 100** 93 0 5 540.14 2680.00
** one change of venue, one withdrawn
Following are the statistics concerning the number of justices and police
magistrates in the various counties:
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JUSTICES OF THE PEACE BY COUNTY POPULATION
1940 Census
No.
Name Population Justices Occupation









2 1 old age pensioner, 1 grocer
0 1 lumberman, 1 rancher, I hatcheryman
1 agriculturalist, 1 miner
Counties over 50,000 Population
El Paso ............ 54,025 6 1 lawyer, 2 laborers























2 are police magistrates, 2 retired, 1 house-
wife, 1 stockman
1 housewife, I meat cutter, 1 farmer
1 retired, 1 hardware man
1 farmer
20,000 Population
1 grocer, I farmer, 1 printer
1 clerk, 1 mechanic
1 painter, 1 news stand, 1 real estate,

































1 farmer, 1 editor, 1 none
1 real estate
1 towerman for railroad
1 farm manager
1 collector, 1 real estate
1 police magistrate
1 weighmaster
I bookkeeper, 1 ass't postmaster
3 are police magistrates
I insurance
* Population of Westwood added to Denver, subtracted from Arapahoe. Only 4
of 81 justices who responded to questionnaire are qualified as attorneys.
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No.
Name Population Justices Occupation





















































1 carpenter; 1 to resign for old age pension
1 grocer, 1 miner
I miner, I insurance
1 filling station operator
1 clerk
1 farmer
I miner, I real estate and insurance
1 bill collector
1 barber, 1 painter
1 miner, 1 clerical
Counties over 4,000 Population






















1 town clerk, 1 old age pensioner
1 merchant




I real estate and insurance
1 carpenter, 1 hotel operator
1 abstractor and clerk dist. court
Counties under 1,000 Population
349 1 (May 1 to Oct. 1) Mechanic
975 1 1 enforcement officer
DICTA 109
COLORADO POLICE MAGISTRATES (P. M.)
(33 Counties)
Judicial
















Kit Carson ...... 4
Lake ................ 5
Larimer ............ 8
























































Laborer-farm and saw mills
1 is co. judge; 1 is JP and engaged
in real estate and insurance; 1
farms and sells farm machinery
City clerk
JP and former farmer
Notary public, real estate











2 are JPs (1 also in insurance and
real estate); I retired
Real estate and insurance
Coal miner
JP (former barber)













Retired sugar company employee
Real estate and insurance












Pueblo ............ 10 1 Pueblo
San Miguel .... 7 2 Telluride
Norwood
Sedgwick ........ 13 1 Julesburg
Summit ........ _ 5 1 Breckenridge
Teller .............. 4 2 Victor
Cripple Creek





Yuma .............. 13 2 Wray
Unknown
Unknown




Undertaker and furniture store
Unknown
JP. and operator of service station
Old age pensioner, prospector
City clerk and JP
City clerk
Lawyer
JP and real estate and insurance
JP and real estate and insurance
JP and real estate and insurance
JP, employee of sugar company
1 retired, 1 insurance business
* Due to telephone strike, unable to determine if there are more police magis-
trates in county.
Is Residence of the Plaintiff, in Colorado, Neces-
sary to Support a Divorce Action Based on Cruelty
Within the State, If Defendant Is a Resident
of Colorado?
By EDWIN M. SEARS*
Attorneys are in doubt regarding the answer to the title question. The
Colorado Supreme Court has not spoken on it. It is the purpose of this paper
to prove that the answer should be in the negative.
I
It seems necessary, first, to allay the apprehension that under the con-
struction of the Colorado divorce statutes, as here proposed, Colorado divorces
could be granted, if the cruelty complained of occurred in this state, though
none of the parties be here domiciled. If section 6 of the statute were so con-
strued, then, it might be said, no residence requirement at all exists as to
either party, and Colorado could become the Mecca of divorce seekers-a
result clearly abhorred by our courts (Sedgwick vs. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 164,
169).
But such would not be the effect of the above proposition. Our statute
clearly, though by implication, requires the residence in the state of one party
*Of the Denver bar.
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to the action as prerequisite of divorce jurisdiction. This follows from the
second proviso of section 6, stating that the suit must be brought in the court
of either plaintiff's or defendant's residence. While this provision purports
to relate to venue rather than jurisdiction, it must be remembered that our
Supreme Court considers venue rules in the divorce statutes, to some extent
at least, as jurisdictional (Branch vs. Branch, 30 Colo. 499, 506). It is all
the more appropriate and mandatory to find in this second proviso in section
6, a statutory rule to the effect that Colorado requires residence in this state
of at least one party to a divorce action as a basis for divorce jurisdiction.
This rule would prevent any undue expansion of the proposition argued in
this article: that no residence of the plaintiff in this state is necessary where
he sues on the ground of cruelty committed in Colorado, and if the defend-
ant's residence is here.
II
As the question before us is that of jurisdiction, it should be pointed
out that jurisdiction means "power", and in this context: "power to grant
a divorce". (Williams vs. North Carolina, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, par. 5 of opin-
ion, 89 Law Ed. 1123, 1126). In this second Williams case, just cited, the
U. S. Supreme Court said, (par. 5 of the opinion): "The domicile of one
spouse within a state gives power to that state to dissolve a marriage wherever
contracted."
It would seem to follow that a Colorado court has jurisdiction in this
sense of "power" to grant a divorce to non-resident plaintiff against a resident
defendant on the ground of cruelty committed within this state.
III
Whatever residence requirement may be thought to exist cannot be de-
duced from any vague ius naturae, or from any a priori postulate of such
residence, but must follow from any one of the following sources:
The full faith and credit or the due process clause of the constitution,
the common law in the sense of judge-made rules, or our divorce statute. If
residence of the plaintiff is not required by any of these, then residence of
the plaintiff is not necessary. It cannot be interpolated from any other source
because there is none.
Residence of the plaintiff is not required under the full faith and credit
clause as the above quoted par. 5 of the Williams case proves. Nevada divorces
need not be recognized abroad, under that case, only because and if neither
party is a resident of the state granting the divorce.
The due process clause of the constitution does not set up a domicile
requirement in the plaintiff to a divorce action. This follows from the Wil-
liams case, itself, as the foreign recognition problem, there dealt with, could
not even come up unless the Nevada judgment withstood the test of due
process. (See Frankfurter, concurring in the first Williams case 317 U.S.
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287, 306; also Prof. Powell, 58 Harvard Law Review [1945] note 139, p.
984).
The common law does not make residence of the plaintiff a prerequisite
to a divorce action. Its jurisdictional requirements are satisfied if one party
resides within the state granting the divorce.
Madden, Domestic Relations (1931) p. 312
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927) p. 290
Schouler, Divorce Manual (1944) sec. 16
Restatement Conflict of Laws, Sect. 113a 1 and 111, and b.
Nelson, on Divorce (1945) par. 21.12
Restatement, Judgments, par. 33(a)
IV
The fact that so many decided divorce cases deal with plaintiff's, and so
few with defendant's residence, might make plaintiff's residence appear of
preponderant importance in such an action. But that phenomenon is easily
explained. In the typical situation inviting any inquiry into jurisdiction, a
plaintiff who claims to be a resident sues a spouse who admittedly is not a
resident of the forum state. In this situation, clearly, the court must find
residence of the plaintiff, or else it cannot have jurisdiction over the "res",
the status of the spouses, as neither one would reside at the forum.
Finding residence of the plaintiff in this common situation is necessary
not because residence of the plaintiff, but because residence of one spouse is
a jurisdictional fact, and because the defendant in this common situation,
admittedly, is not a resident of the forum state.
V
Since, then, residence of the plaintiff in a divorce action is not necessary
under any of the rules discussed under III and IV above, the only remaining
question is whether such requirement is set up by our divorce statute. The
answer should be in the negative.
(1) The only statutory provision in Colorado, setting up any require-
ment of residence is section 6, chapter 56, C.S.A. In its first sentence, this
section ordains one year residence of the plaintiff as a prerequisite to a divorce
action; but "this section" shall not be applicable in divorce cases based on
cruelty committed in Colorado,
The expression "this section" pnust refer to the preceding sentence, and
it must refer to the whole of it. It cannot, grammatically, refer to one part,
but not to another. It cannot, even in purely philological contemplation, be
held to rule out the "one year", and yet sustain the "residence" requirement.
The part of section 6 declared to be inapplicable in "this section", i.e. its
first sentence, no more, and particularly, no less. In none of the numerous
cases cited in W and P, Perm. Ed., vol. 38, p. 450, et seq. has 'the expression
"this section" been construed not to refer to the whole of the preceding sub-
division.
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The correctness of this interpretation is shown by a certain practice
followed in all divisions of the Denver District Court. It is the Generally
Followed Practice to Allow Proof of Plaintiff's Residence in Intra-State
Cruelty cases by Means Other Than Testimony of a Third Person. If the first
proviso of section 6 eliminated the "one year" residence requirement only,
but not the other elements contained in the first sentence of section 6, then,
clearly, residence of the plaintiff would have to be established in all cases by
testimony of a witness other than the plaintiff. The general practice dis-
pensing with such evidence in cruelty cases is a clear indication that the first
proviso is thought to qualify the initial rule in section 6 in toto, not only
as to the "one year" element.
The appropriateness of this practice, and of the interpretation of section
6 here advocated, also follows from the nature of a "proviso". Bouvier (Law
Dictionary) states: "The purpose of a proviso is to except the clause covered
,by it from the provisions of a statute, or to qualify the operation of a statute".
WAile definitions sunt periculosae, and while a proviso may at times operate
in a different way, it seems worth noting that under the above definition, and
absent any reasons to qualify its import here, the first sentence of section 6
is superseded by this first proviso. The effect of it, then, is to do away with
sentence 1 in toto, thereby eliminating any residence requirement in the
plaintiff in case of cruelty committed in Colorado, but leaving, of course,
intact the rule requiring residence of at least one party to a divorce action in
this state.
(2) Public policy does not argue against this theory which considers
the whole of the first sentence in section 6 inapplicable to intra-state cruelty
cases. Colorado's public policy to prevent "temporary" residents from obtain-
ing divorces in this state (Sedgwick vs. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 164, 169) is
clearly not directed at situations where Colorado has a natural connection
with the matrimonial relationship of the parties, through residence of the
defendant and the locus delicti commissi. That policy has, moreover, been
tempered, in intra-state cruelty cases, by the express elimination of the one
year requirement. A plaintiff could admittedly sue on cruelty, under the
first proviso of section 6, the very minute after having established a possibly
rather tenuous residence here; and he could then sue even a non-resident
spouse. Public policy clearly permits such divorce suit operating on an
actually very casual relation of the spouses to Colorado. It is'difficult to
see why this public policy should object to a Colorado divorce action where
the spouses' relation to Colorado, through defendant's residence and mis-
conduct, is, by comparison, intimate, and where both parties are personally
under the jurisdiction of the Court, the plaintiff by invoking it, and the
defendant by being a Colorado resident.
(3) The wording of the Colorado statute, it has been shown, supports
the thesis of this paper, and public policy does not oppose it. This latter is
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true, particularly, because the theory here advocated will not result in a
flood of divorces sought by visitors to this state. Residence of one of the
spouses is necessary, under the second proviso of section 6, to give a Colorado
court divorce jurisdiction. But it is the thesis of this article that such residence
of one spouse is sufficient in an intra-state cruelty case, whether that spouse
be the plaintiff or the defendant.
(4) No cases but one have been found where a non-resident plaintiff
sues a resident defendant on the ground of cruelty committed within the
state, under a statute similar to ours. Some cases declare the occurrence
within the state of misconduct, without residence of any of the spouses, a
sufficient basis of divorce jurisdiction (see note 59 LRA p. 154), others deny
that (17 A.J. sect. 245; 27 C.J.S. sec. 80 note 63). But this, obviously, is
not our question, because we assume the defendant to be a resident of Colo-
rado.
The one case in point is Kokinakis vs. Kokinakis, 180 U.S.W. 2nd, 243
(Mo).
There a soldier stationed in Missouri, whose residence in Missouri was
at least questionable, sued his spouse, a resident of Missouri, in that state on
the ground of cruelty committed therein. The court held for the plaintiff,
on the assumption of plaintiff's non-residence. The court said under (3):
"We do not need to put plaintiff's right to a divorce action upon his resi-
dence".
The applicable Missouri statute (quoted from Martindale-Hubbell) reads:
"No person who has not resided in the state for one year next before filing
of the petition is entitled-to a divorce unless the offense or injury occurred
within the state, (or while one party or both parties resided in the state)"
(Parentheses ours).
The similarity of this statute to ours is fairly obvious up to that part
which above is put in parentheses. This clause in parentheses must be disre-
garded for purposes of comparison with our statute because it deals with a
situation not here involved. The clause in parentheses clearly refers to
offenses which occurred outside the state. This follows from an application
of elementary rules of construction, as the clause in parentheses follows that
dealing with offenses within Missouri. The purpose of the clause in paren-
theses is to allow divorce actions in Missouri without one year residence of
the plaintiff though the offenses occurred outside the state, if one party
resided in Missouri at the time the acts of cruelty' occurred. The Missouri
statute, in other words, does away with the one year residence requirement
not only in case of intra-state cruelty, but also if the cruelty is committed
outside the state if one of the parties then resides in Missouri. The Missouri
statute does not however say anything about the dispensability with plain-
tiff's residence at the time the action is brought. On this point, the Missouri
as well as the Colorado statute are silent except insofar as they declare the
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general rule of one year's residence inapplicable. The persuasiveness of the
Kokinakis case can therefore not be discredited on the ground of substantial
differences of the Missouri and the Colorado statutes.
When considering offenses within Missouri, the Missouri courts are
faced with a statute which, like ours in effect, says: A plaintiff in a divorce
action must have been a resident of the state for one year except where the
offense occurred within the state. The only difference between the Missouri
and our statute insofar is that the latter introduces the differential treatment
of intra-state cruelty cases with the. words "provided that this section shall
not affect" them, while the Missouri statute ordains the general rule of one
year residence "unless" the offense occurred in the state. Under either statute,
we have a general rule of one year residence, followed by a qualification re-
garding intra-state cruelty cases.
Under either statute, the courts are faced, therefore, with the problem
treated in this article: whether the qualification following the rule eliminates
the "one year" requirement only of the rule, or whether it eliminates it in
toto, so as to make residence of the plaintiff in intra-state cruelty cases en-
tirely unnecessary.
On this precise question, the Missouri case deals with the identical prob-
lem now before us. And the Missouri holding to the effect that residence of
plaintiff is not required in intra-state cruelty cases should, therefore, be per-
suasive to a Colorado court.
VI
Detailed analysis has led to the conclusion that neither our statute nor
any other rule of law require plaintiff's residence in Colorado as a prerequisite
to t divorce action against a resident defendant based on cruelty committed
widhin the state. The same result is reached if the problem is tested against
fuidamental, rational, "first" principles.
The purpose of all residence requirements in divorce actions is to assure
power of the court over the res, the martial relationship, and over the parties
to the action. This power of the court is undeniably present when a resident
plaintiff-be his residence ever so short-sues a non-resident defendant on
cruelty committed within the state even though the defendant be served by
publication. The power of the court in the situation dealt with in this paper
(where a non-resident plaintiff sues a resident defendant on the ground of
intra-state cruelty) seems much more direct and the nexus much closer than
in the typical example of the preceding sentence.
The court here has power over the res as the defendant is a resident,
and the latter's marital relationship therefore clearly subject to the power of
the Colorado court. Since there can be no marital relationship except between
two persons, power of the court over defendant's marriage necessarily implies
that over the plaintiff's. (See Goodrich, on Conflicts of Law, 1927, p. 292,
bottom). A Colorado court, therefore, has equal power over the status of
the parties to a divorce action regardless of whether the resident or the non-
resident spouse brings suit.
Power of the Colorado court over the persons is, clearly, stronger in the
case here dealt with, than in the typical example in the paragraph before
last. In that example, the court has power over one party only, the plaintiff.
Here, jurisdiction over the persons is perfect as the defendant resides here,
and as the plaintiff submits himself by invoking the Colorado court's powers.
The Colorado Supreme Court has never held that Colorado courts have
no power to grant a divorce in this situation. The much quoted statement,
"Residence is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the parties" (Branch
vs. Branch, 30 Colo. 499, 506) does not argue against the theory here de-
veloped. In the Branch case, the plaintiff sued in a county where neither he
nor the defendant resided. It is in this context that this statement must be
read and understood. It did not mean to, and does not, say that a non,
resident plaintiff may not sue a resident defendant on grounds of cruelty
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